Oklahoma Law Review
Volume 67

Number 1

2014

Tethered to the Statute: How the Third Circuit’s Narrow
Interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) Will Shape the Future of
Cost-Shifting and E-Discovery for the Better
Jason L. Callaway

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Computer Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jason L. Callaway, Tethered to the Statute: How the Third Circuit’s Narrow Interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §
1920(4) Will Shape the Future of Cost-Shifting and E-Discovery for the Better, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 191 (2014),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss1/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Oklahoma Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma
College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact Law-LibraryDigitalCommons@ou.edu.

NOTE
Tethered to the Statute: How the Third Circuit’s Narrow
Interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) Will Shape the Future
of Cost-Shifting and E-Discovery for the Better
I. Introduction
Discovery has grown by orders of magnitude since the advent of the
computer. Once, the largest of cases required a team of legal professionals
to pore through tens of thousands of paper documents to find responsive
discovery. Now, word-processing, e-mail, and ever-expanding databases
ensure that the same team will face millions upon millions of potentially
disclosable documents.1 Thankfully, the same computers that generate such
masses of information make sifting through those masses during discovery
much easier.2 Computers can do only what they are told to do, however,
and lawyers often lack the technical understanding to exploit computers’
potential without help.3 Thus, as a new world of electronic discovery (ediscovery) emerges, lawyers must seek assistance from those outside the
legal profession.
Enter the e-discovery vendor, a third party hired to handle the technical
aspects of e-discovery. These experts are hired by law firms, or even by the
parties themselves, to “collect, process, set up for review, and produce”
electronically stored information (ESI).4 ESI includes, but is not limited to,
1. There are estimates that the amount of stored, discoverable data that an average
company retains will double every three years. See MICHAEL R. ARKFELD, PROLIFERATION OF
“ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION” (ESI) AND REIMBURSABLE PRIVATE CLOUD
COMPUTING COSTS 5 (2011), available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/pdf/2011
0721073226_large.pdf.
2. Right now, for example, major strides are being made in the acceptance and use of
predictive coding, a way to automate part of the discovery process by having human
reviewers teach a computer to find responsive documents. See Adam M. Acosta, Predictive
Coding: The Beginning of a New E-Discovery Era, RES GESTAE, Oct. 2012, at 8, 8.
3. As electronic discovery specialist Dennis Kiker said when predicting the rise of
malpractice suits for electronic discovery mistakes, “Not even IT professionals pretend to
understand all of the different information systems that exist in a single company. Do we
really expect every trial attorney to have greater expertise and understanding than the
professionals that work in the field every day?” Doug Austin, eDiscovery Trends: Is
eDiscovery Malpractice More Widespread Than You Think?, EDISCOVERY DAILY BLOG
(July 6, 2011), http://www.ediscoverydaily.com/2011/07/ediscovery-trends-is-ediscoverymalpractice-more-widespread-than-you-think.html.
4. ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY DESKBOOK § 3:5.3 (Thomas Y. Allman et al. eds., 2012),
available at Westlaw PLIREF-EDDBK. For a thorough, though now slightly outdated, look
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e-mails, documents, databases, web pages, any information stored on
removable memory (e.g., flash drives), and any information held on a cloud
server.5 Many e-discovery vendors can also perform computer forensics,
data recovery, and a host of other tasks that a party may need.6 In a very
real sense, the e-discovery vendor fills a similar role in the digital world
that the team of document reviewers did in the world of paper.
To the dismay of those paying the legal bills, the services of an ediscovery vendor can be expensive.7 Clients have always been costconscious, but the recent economic downturn has increased the pressure on
lawyers to save money wherever possible.8 Some have looked to their own
financial structures for answers, attempting alternative billing arrangements
or outsourcing as methods for cost-saving.9 Others have formulated a much
simpler solution: make the losing party pay.10 Unfortunately, the American
Rule requires each party to pay its own litigation expenses, denying the
opportunity for cost-shifting.11 Thus, the American Rule presents a
potentially insurmountable barrier to this simple solution.
at the different services that an e-discovery vendor might offer, see MATTHEW I. COHEN ET
AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR THE SELECTION OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY VENDORS: NAVIGATING
THE VENDOR PROPOSAL PROCESS 21-25 (June 2007 version), available at https://thesedona
conference.org/download-pub/80.
5. BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN, RONALD J. HEDGES, & ELIZABETH C. WIGGINS, MANAGING
DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONIC INFORMATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 2 (2d ed. 2012),
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/eldscpkt2d_eb.pdf/$file/eldscpkt2d_
eb.pdf. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure define ESI expansively as “including writings,
drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, images, and other data or data
compilations—stored in any medium from which information can be obtained.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 34(a)(1)(A).
6. COHEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 21-25.
7. In 2010, one thousand of the largest companies in the United States expected to
spend approximately $1.3 billion dollars on e-discovery costs as part of their corporate
litigation efforts. See Nathan Koppel, Business Technology: Using Software to Sift Digital
Records—Looking to Pare Litigation Costs, Firms Use Technology to Find Relevant
Electronic Documents in Legal Discovery Process, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2010, at B6.
8. Ed Poll, Legal Fees: How to Address the Client Pressure to Lower Fees, ABA LAW
PRACTICE TODAY (May 2009), http://apps.americanbar.org/lpm/lpt/articles/fin05091.shtml.
9. See Rachel M. Zahorsky, Facing the Alternative: How Does a Flat Fee System
Really Work?, ABA J., Mar. 2012, at 40; Paul Lippe, Want Quality? Learn to Operate,
LEGAL REBELS (July 26, 2012, 1:45 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/the_
age_of_operational_law/.
10. Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 159-60 (3d Cir.
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012).
11. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 98 (9th ed. 2009); cf. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 269 (1975) (noting that Congress’s approach to the
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However, the law includes exceptions to the American Rule, one of
which is 28 U.S.C. § 1920. This statute allows the victorious party to
recoup some of the “relatively minor, incidental expenses” of litigation.12
Few of the statute’s drafters likely foresaw its provisions’ effects as
applying to anything like e-discovery vendors; the statute has existed in
some form for more than a century.13 Yet, some parties now argue that ediscovery vendor costs can be placed on the losing party under § 1920(4),14
which allows the winner to recover “the costs of making copies of any
materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case.”15
Prior to the computer revolution, courts understandably interpreted this
provision as referring to the cost of making physical copies of documents,
meaning the cost of paper.16 However, as the Supreme Court of Tennessee
noted, “The law is not static and requires lawyers to push its boundaries,
including seeking change therein.”17 Enterprising attorneys have attempted
to capitalize on the shifting technological landscape by framing the services
of e-discovery vendors as “the 21st Century equivalent of making copies.”18
If accepted, their argument would place the high costs of both parties’ ediscovery squarely on the loser.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently rejected this expansive
argument in Race Tires America, Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp.19 With
the American Rule as an ever-present background to its statutory analysis,
the Third Circuit limited the applicability of § 1920(4) with regard to e-

American Rule has been to “carve out specific exceptions” rather than to give courts
discretion to shift costs based on the facts of a case).
12. Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2006 (2012).
13. See infra Part II.C.
14. E.g., Brief of Appellee Hoosier Racing Tire Corp. at 16-18, Race Tires Am., Inc. v.
Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012) (No.
11-2316), 2011 WL 4351546, at *16-*18; Principal and Response Brief of Defendants-Cross
Appellants Cisco Ironport Sys., LLC and Return Path, Inc. at 52-54, CBT Flint Partners,
LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1381 (N.D. Ga. 2009), vacated, 654 F.3d
1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2010-1202, 2010-1203), 2010 WL 3950006, at *52-*54.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) (2012).
16. E.g., Alexander v. Nat’l Farmers Org., 696 F.2d 1210, 1212 (8th Cir. 1982); Roberts
v. Charter Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 112 F.R.D. 411, 414 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
17. Flowers v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, 314 S.W.3d 882, 897 (Tenn. 2010)
(discussing the ethics underlying the requirement that lawyers advocate zealously for their
clients).
18. CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1381 (N.D. Ga.
2009), vacated, 654 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
19. 674 F.3d 158, 171 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012).
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discovery.20 It concluded that only a few of the services performed by the ediscovery vendor fell within the meaning of § 1920(4); the bulk of the
vendors’ services remained outside the statute.21 The Third Circuit’s narrow
ruling is an accurate analysis of both the precedent and policy surrounding
cost-shifting and § 1920, and it should become the prototype for federal
courts’ treatment of future cases.
This Note explores the Third Circuit’s ruling and, in so doing,
demonstrates why it is both legally sound and likely to become the majority
view across the country. Part II presents the existing policy and statutes
underlying the taxation of copying costs. Part III discusses the Third
Circuit’s decision in Race Tires, including the factual and procedural
background. Part IV follows the Third Circuit’s analysis of the law,
showing how it comports with the Supreme Court’s opinions on § 1920 and
is supported by other precedents and policies. Part V predicts how other
courts will view Race Tires based on their own precedents and discusses the
potentially negative implications of the Third Circuit’s ruling for the legal
community.
II. Summary of Existing Law: The Rules and Policies at Play
Both the American Rule and exceptions like 28 U.S.C. § 1920 are the
product of centuries of American jurisprudence and tradition, stretching
back as far as the early days of the Supreme Court.22 Understanding the
American Rule and its place in federal court is central to understanding the
Third Circuit’s ruling in Race Tires and, moreover, why that ruling is
correct.
A. Foundation: How the American Rule Affects Potential Cost-Shifting
The American Rule’s prohibition on cost-shifting has rested at the heart
of any question of costs in the United States almost as long as there has
been a United States. The American Rule is “[t]he general policy that all
litigants, even the prevailing one, must bear their own attorney’s fees.”23
Although it most often appears in the context of suits for attorney’s fees,
courts interpret the American Rule expansively to encompass most
expenses of litigation.24 The American Rule breaks from the English Rule,
20. Id. at 164, 169.
21. Id. at 171-72.
22. See infra Parts II.A, C.
23. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 98 (9th ed. 2009).
24. See, e.g., Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 678 F.3d 1199,
1201 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that the American Rule requires all parties to “pay their own
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which places the burden of the all legal fees on the losing party.25 The
English Rule, as its name implies, is followed in the United Kingdom as
well as in most civil law countries.26
It is unknown precisely when colonial courts began to move away from
the English tradition, but the Supreme Court settled the matter for federal
courts in 1796.27 In Arcambel v. Wiseman, where a defeated party objected
to paying his opponent’s attorney’s fee, the Court wrote:
We do not think that this charge ought to be allowed. The
general practice of the United States is in oposition [sic] to it;
and even if that practice were not strictly correct in principle, it
is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, or
modified, by statute.28
The Court has repeatedly upheld the American Rule in later cases.29
Beginning with its initial ruling in Arcambel, the Court has been incredibly
wary of allowing any exception to the American Rule that Congress did not
create.30
The policies underlying the American Rule are fundamental to the
American legal system. First and foremost, courts do not want to punish or
discourage poor parties from bringing suit, especially when “litigation is at
best uncertain.”31 Were the rule not in place, wealthy litigants could
intimidate opponents with the fear of being spent out of civil court and into
bankruptcy court.32 Such a result would violate our long-standing ideal that

fees and costs in connection with bringing a law suit”); Fednav Int’l Ltd. v. Cont’l Ins. Co.,
624 F.3d 834, 839-40 (7th Cir. 2010) (differentiating attorney’s fees from costs and other
expenses).
25. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 609 (9th ed. 2009).
26. Brandon Chad Bungard, Fee! Fie! Foe! Fum!: I Smell the Efficiency of the English
Rule Finding the Right Approach to Tort Reform, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 34 (2006).
27. For an extensive look at the history of the American Rule in the Supreme Court, see
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247-57 (1975).
28. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796).
29. See Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 250 (gathering cases).
30. Id. at 247 (“[W]e are convinced that it would be inappropriate for the Judiciary,
without legislative guidance, to reallocate the burdens of litigation in the manner and to the
extent urged by respondents . . . .”).
31. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
32. Consider the story of Pauline Hughes, who on appeal lost her negligence suit against
a group of physicians in connection with her husband’s death during surgery. Having tried
her case in the United Kingdom, Mrs. Hughes was left with her own attorney’s bill of
$146,000 and the opposing attorney’s bill of $144,000. See John F. Vargo, The American
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each person should have their day in court.33 Moreover, allowing fees and
costs would create what the Court has called “a second major litigation” for
every case,34 with two effects. First, the legal battle over costs would
necessarily create new, additional legal fees for a party that has already lost
on the merits. Second, the dispute over costs “would pose substantial
burdens for judicial administration” by doubling every judge’s caseload.35
Some commentators nevertheless urge courts to ignore or create judicial
exceptions to the American Rule.36 Despite these voices, most courts
continue to follow the American Rule and, like the Supreme Court in
Arcambel, accept only legislative exceptions.
B. Bridging the Gap: How Rule 54(d)(1) Connects § 1920(4) to the
American Rule
Under most circumstances, the American Rule prevents the majority of
litigation expenses from being shifted between parties. Yet Congress,
occasionally with the assistance of the judicial branch, can and has crafted
specific exceptions to that rule.37 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 has
contained the exception for litigation costs like copying since the Rules
were first introduced.38 Rule 54(d)(1) now reads, in pertinent part: “Unless
a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—
other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party.”39
Recall that the Supreme Court in Arcambel required a statute to modify the

Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV.
1567, 1568-69 (1993).
33. Although the origin of the phrase “day in court” remains unclear, it was a regular
part of the legal discourse by the beginning of the eighteenth century. JAMES E. CLAPP ET AL.,
LAWTALK: THE UNKNOWN STORIES BEHIND FAMILIAR LEGAL EXPRESSIONS 80-81 (2011).
34. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532
U.S. 598, 609 (2001) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)).
35. Fleischmann Distilling, 386 U.S. at 718.
36. E.g., Bungard, supra note 26; James Windon, Fee Shifting in Libel Litigation: How
the American Approach to Costs Allocation Inhibits the Achievement of Libel Law’s
Substantive Goals, 3 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 175 (2010).
37. For a discussion of allowable exceptions to the American Rule, see Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 257-62 (1975).
38. In the 1940 United States Code, the first to include the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the cost-shifting provision read as follows: “Except when express provision
therefor is made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs shall be
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 54(d) (1940) (current version at FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1)).
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss1/5

2014]

NOTE

197

American Rule.40 Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are as much
statutes as the rest of the United States Code, Rule 54(d)(1) serves as the
statutory predicate necessary for cost-shifting.41 Although not a major piece
of Race Tires, Rule 54(d)(1)’s allowance of costs in federal actions
connects the overarching policy of the American Rule to the specific
exception at play in the case.
While Rule 54(d)(1) serves as the statutory exception necessary to set
aside the American Rule, its language is incredibly vague. Neither the rule
nor the subsequent comments define what could be considered a “cost.”42
That definition instead lies in 28 U.S.C. § 1920, the current incarnation of
one of Congress’s exceptions to the American Rule and the statute at issue
in Race Tires.43
C. Exception in Action: How 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) Circumvents the
American Rule
Congress began allowing some recovery of litigation costs as part of the
Act of February 26, 1853, its first major attempt to incorporate an exception
to the American Rule into statute.44 According to the Supreme Court,
Congress sought to “standardize the costs allowable in federal litigation” in
order to prevent “losing litigants . . . [from] being unfairly saddled with
exorbitant fees.”45 The exception for copying costs became part of the first
United States Code,46 and Congress retained the substance of the provision
in the Revised Code of 1948 to ensure “rigid controls on cost-shifting in
federal courts.”47 The legislature’s most recent interaction with the statute

40. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Brandt, 8 F.R.D. 163, 164 (D. Mont. 1948) (holding that
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “have the same force and effect as other statutory
enactments by Congress”).
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1) and Advisory Committee notes.
43. Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 163 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012).
44. Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 251-53.
45. Id. at 251.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 830 (1925). The statute allowed “lawful fees for exemplifications and
copies of papers . . . [to] be included in and form a portion of a judgment or decree against
the losing party.” Id.
47. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 164 (quoting Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482
U.S. 437, 445 (1987)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012). It was at this point that the
exception’s designation became 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4). Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 255.
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came in 2008, when it revised the language to refer to “materials” rather
than “papers” in recognition of advancing technology.48
Section 1920(4) seems relatively straightforward, but it hides a
potentially enormous ambiguity for a digital world. It allows “[a] judge or
clerk . . . [to] tax as costs . . . [f]ees for exemplification and the costs of
making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained
for use in the case.”49 For most of the statute’s existence, the meaning of
copying was clear—it referred to the creation of a physical duplicate of a
document.50 The method of creating that duplicate may have changed, most
notably with the introduction of the modern copy machine,51 but the
material requirements remained the same: one piece of paper became two
(roughly) identical pieces of paper.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that Congress “comprehensively
addressed” the statutory limitations on fees in § 1920 and in a companion
statute not at issue here.52 However, the introduction of digital documents
clouded the meaning of “copy,” and the Supreme Court has not examined §
1920(4) since the digital revolution began.53 Lower courts have split on the
breadth of the word “copy.” Courts applying the so-called broad
interpretation allow the winner to recover all or nearly all e-discovery costs,
while those employing the narrow interpretation limit costs to only a small
48. Judicial Administration and Technical Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110406, 122 Stat. 4291. Although it is beyond the scope of this Note, it is worth considering
whether the cost to use additive manufacturing (also called “3-D printing”) to create copies
of physical objects (for exhibits, etc.) could be considered a cost to “mak[e] copies of any
materials” and, thus, within the bounds of the § 1920. For a primer on the topic, see AM
Basics, ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING (2013), http://additivemanufacturing.com/basics/.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) (2012). Although it is fertile ground for contention, the Third
Circuit did not address the exact meaning of the phrase “necessarily obtained for use in the
case.” Its ruling is limited solely to interpreting the meaning of the word “copy,” and this
Note will only address that aspect of the statute. For more information on the topic of
necessity, see Steven C. Bennett, Are E-Discovery Costs Recoverable by a Prevailing
Party?, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 537, 545-47 (2010).
50. Cf. Fogleman v. ARAMCO (Arabian Am. Oil Co.), 920 F.2d 278, 286 (5th Cir.
1991) (using the “xerox copy” as the standard for a copied document).
51. For an entertaining look at one law professor’s experience with the history of
modern copying, see David D. Siegel, My Life in Paper, 78 N.Y. ST. BAR J. 46 (2006).
52. Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. at 442. The other statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1821, describes
costs allowable to witnesses for their expenses in being part of a trial (e.g., subsistence,
mileage, etc.).
53. Of the few cases interpreting any part of § 1920, most have dealt with § 1920(3)
(witness fees) and § 1920(6) (fees for court-appointed experts and interpreters). See, e.g.,
Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. at 438; Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997,
1998 (2012).
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portion of the total.54 As a result of this confusion, the questions to be
resolved in Race Tires emerge: what exactly is a copy of a whollyelectronic document? And more importantly, who should pay for it?
III. Presentation of the Case: The Running of Race Tires
A. Preparing for Race Day: The Events Leading to the Third Circuit’s
Opinion
Race Tires was a bitterly fought case from beginning to end.55 It began in
the Western District of Pennsylvania as a relatively straightforward antitrust
case brought under the Sherman Act.56 Race Tires America (Race), the
plaintiff in the district court suit, and Hoosier Racing Tire (Hoosier), one of
the two defendants in the case, were tire suppliers contesting for economic
victory in the world of competitive motor sports.57 The other named
defendant, Dirt Motor Sports, Inc. (DMS), was a sanctioning body in the
racing world.58
Race brought suit after DMS instituted a “single tire rule” for its races
and selected Hoosier as its exclusive supplier.59 A single-tire rule, as its
name suggests, requires all competitors in a particular race to use the same
brand and type of tire on their vehicles.60 Competition to be the chosen

54. Compare, e.g., Windy City Innovations, LLC v. Am. Online, Inc., No. 04 C 4240,
2006 WL 2224057, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2006) (disallowing fees for optical character
recognition, document coding, and keyword searching services), and Fast Memory Erase,
LLC v. Spansion, Inc., No. 3-10-CV-0481-M-BD, 2010 WL 5093945, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Nov.
10, 2010) (disallowing “costs for collecting and processing ESI”), with In re Ricoh Co.
Patent Litig., 661 F.3d 1361, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that, absent an agreement
between the parties, the cost of creating a database is recoverable).
55. The district court described the parties as having a “lengthy and contentious”
history, and it “noted on numerous occasions the considerable tension among the respective
parties and their attorneys.” Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 660 F. Supp.
2d 590, 595 (W.D. Pa. 2009).
56. Id. at 594.
57. Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 160 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Race Tires, 660 F. Supp. 2d at 596. The Third Circuit discussed in some depth the
advantages and disadvantages of single-tire rules as compared to “open tire” rules. See Race
Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57, 69-72 (3d Cir. 2010). Both the
district and appellate courts noted that tires were not unusual in being restricted; other racing
associations have restricted carburetors, mufflers, cylinder heads, and even engines and
chassis. See id. at 63; Race Tires, 660 F. Supp. 2d at 597.
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supplier is understandably fierce, as the supplier gains exclusive access to a
market that will require a large amount of its product.61 Race and Hoosier
were among those that submitted bids to DMS for its exclusive contract,
and DMS chose Hoosier after a thorough investigation of all of the bids.62
Race estimated its damages as a result of not receiving the contract
exceeded thirty million dollars.63 That number would triple if the court
found that Hoosier and DMS violated the Sherman Act.64
Unfortunately for Race, it would never lay claim to those damages. The
district court granted summary judgment to both Hoosier and DMS, holding
that there could be no violation of the Sherman Act where “a sanctioning
body freely decides to adopt a single tire rule, and then freely selects a
supplier.”65 On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s
ruling.66 The appellate court expanded on the district court’s reasoning and
created a bright-line standard for single-product rules and antitrust liability:
as long as the sanctioning body “freely” chooses its rule and has “sufficient
pro-competitive or business justifications” for making the rule, there will be
no antitrust liability for its exclusive contracts with suppliers.67
As part of litigating the case, the parties made extensive requests for ESI
from each other.68 The district court’s Case Management Order required the
parties to agree to a list of search terms for database searches, convert all
files to Tagged Image File Format (TIFF), produce certain metadata fields,
and create searchable versions of any text file.69 Each of the parties hired an
e-discovery vendor to manage its part in the discovery process.70 The court
accepted Race’s categorization of the vendors’ activities: “(1) preservation
and collection of ESI; (2) processing the collected ESI; (3) keyword
61. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 160.
62. Race Tires, 660 F. Supp. 2d at 599-600. It is worth noting that Race, though
unsuccessful in this bid, had received single-tire rule contracts previously. Race Tires, 614
F.3d at 65.
63. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 161.
64. Any domestic party injured by an antitrust violation can, under the Sherman Act,
“recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney’s fee.” 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).
65. Race Tires, 660 F. Supp. 2d at 606.
66. Race Tires, 614 F.3d at 85.
67. Id. at 81.
68. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 161.
69. Id. “Metadata” is information, sometimes visible and sometimes hidden, that
provides additional information about the ESI, such as dates of creation and editing, author’s
or editor’s identity, etc. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 3. For a glossary of basic ediscovery terms, see id. at 22-26.
70. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 161.
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searching; (4) culling privileged material; (5) scanning and TIFF
conversion; (6) optical character recognition (‘OCR’) conversion; and (7)
conversion of racing videos from VHS format to DVD format.”71 With the
help of their e-discovery vendors, DMS and Hoosier together produced
slightly over 600,000 electronic documents in response to Race’s discovery
requests.72
While Hoosier and DMS were likely enthusiastic about winning on
summary judgment, their e-discovery costs undoubtedly tempered their joy.
Hoosier’s vendor presented a bill for more than $125,000, while DMS’s
vendor sought almost $330,000.73 Maneuvering for some relief, Hoosier
and DMS included the vendors’ charges on the bills of costs they presented
to the district court clerk.74 Following Race’s objection, DMS dropped its
claim to slightly more than $240,000, stating that its vendor’s invoices
“were exceedingly confusing and inconsistent.”75 Noting the lack of
Supreme Court precedent and the circuit split on whether e-discovery costs
could be considered within the statute,76 the clerk decided to allow almost
all of the vendors’ bills as costs under § 1920(4) because the vendors’
“expertise [was] necessary to retrieve and prepare” the responsive
documents, making the vendors “an indispensable part of the process.”77
Understandably, Race appealed the clerk’s decision, which would force
it to pay over $360,000 to the parties it had just unsuccessfully sued.78
However, the district court issued a memorandum opinion upholding the
clerk’s finding.79 The district court, like the clerk, felt that the
indispensability of the vendors to the e-discovery process brought them
within the bounds of § 1920(4).80 Race appealed once more, bringing the
case to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.81

71. Id. at 161-62.
72. Id. at 162.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 162-63.
78. Id. at 163.
79. Id. The memorandum opinion is styled Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire
Corp., No. 2:07–cv–1294, 2011 WL 1748620 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 2011).
80. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 163.
81. Id.
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B. It’s Race Day! The Third Circuit’s Opinion Finds the Narrow
Interpretation Beating the Broad by a Wide Margin
The Third Circuit’s decision, despite its modern topic, is a fairly standard
case of statutory interpretation. The court opened the opinion by narrowing
its gaze to the piece of the § 1920 at issue.82 In interpreting the statute, the
court defined its terms and then looked to both past precedent and present
policy for direction.83 The court also examined the common arguments
given in favor of the broad interpretation of the statute, but it found those
arguments “untethered from the statutory mooring.”84 The Third Circuit
concluded that the narrow interpretation of the statute was correct and
prevented Hoosier and DMS from recovering most of their e-discovery
costs.85
1. Pole Position: The Third Circuit Resolves Preliminary Matters
The court began its inquiry by focusing on the specific language of 28
U.S.C. § 1920(4) at issue. The statute allows a court to award “[f]ees for
exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials.”86 No
party’s brief distinguished between exemplification and copying, despite
the “well-established canon of statutory interpretation” that Congress’s use
of different words in a statute signals its intent for those words to have
different meanings.87 Like copying, the Supreme Court has not defined
exemplification, and lower courts are split as to its meaning.88 The Federal
Circuit, applying the Sixth Circuit’s narrow interpretation, found
exemplification to be “an official transcript of a public record, authenticated
as a true copy for use as evidence.”89 By contrast, the Seventh Circuit has
followed a broad interpretation, ruling that exemplification fees could be
awarded for the cost to create any exhibit “[s]o long as the means of
presentation furthers the illustrative purpose of [the] exhibit.”90 The Third

82. Id. at 165-66.
83. Id. at 163-65.
84. Id. at 169.
85. Id. at 171.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) (2012).
87. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 165 (citing SEC v. McCarthy, 332 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir.
2003)).
88. Id. at 159.
89. Kohus v. Cosco, Inc., 282 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY, 593 (7th ed. 1999)) (refusing under Sixth Circuit precedent to award costs for
creating a video exhibit).
90. Cefalu v. Vill. of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416, 428 (7th Cir. 2000).
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Circuit found, however, that there was no possible definition of
exemplification that could apply to the case at bar, ending its consideration
of the issue.91
The Third Circuit also saw fit to address a small but important
procedural aspect of § 1920 before beginning its analysis.92 Seemingly
exasperated, the court chastised Hoosier and DMS for the “lack of
specificity and clarity” in their bills of costs.93 In the context of awards for
attorney’s fees, the Supreme Court stated that the party seeking fees has the
burden of demonstrating its claim.94 In some circuits, this language has
been taken to mean that the bill’s proponent should provide “an itemized
list with sufficient specificity” to allow the clerk or court to understand how
the cost is within one of the allowable categories.95 Both vendors’ invoices
included pseudo-technical terms like “EDD Processing” and “Performing
Searching/Filtering/Exporting” that tried to hide the invoices’ lack of actual
information about the vendors’ services.96 The Third Circuit did not
approve.97 It also took issue with the fact that neither invoice included
either a rationale for the vendors’ activities or any measure of results.98 The
court eventually accepted Race’s categorization of the vendors’ services in
order to move forward with its analysis.99 However, the implication of this
section of the opinion is that the court will expect the same level of detail
from vendors seeking fees that it does from attorneys.100
91. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 166. Given the methods it used to define copying, the Third
Circuit would likely follow the Sixth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of exemplification.
92. Id. at 166-67.
93. Id. at 166.
94. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983).
95. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C 10–03561 WHA, 2012 WL 3822129, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2012) (citing In re Ricoh Co. Ltd. Patent Litigation, 661 F.3d 1361, 1368
(Fed. Cir 2011).
96. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 167.
97. Id. at 166.
98. Id. at 167.
99. Id.
100. In Hensley v. Eckerhart, the Supreme Court held that an attorney seeking a fee must
“exercise ‘billing judgment’ with respect to hours worked” and “maintain billing time
records in a manner that will enable a reviewing court to identify distinct claims.” 461 U.S.
424, 437 (1983). In the Third Circuit, courts have a duty to “exclude from counsel’s fee
request ‘hours that are excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary.’” Holmes v.
Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 583, 595 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at
434). Interestingly, in broad interpretation jurisdictions the need to create a detailed fee
request under § 1920(4) could spawn the “second major litigation” that the Supreme Court
wanted to avoid in Hensley, except the litigation would be between the vendor with an
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2. Green Flag: The Third Circuit Starts Its Analytical Engines
With frustration vented and focus narrowed, the Third Circuit began its
statutory analysis by defining a “copy” in the context of § 1920(4).101 It
adopted the definition of Webster’s Third New International Dictionary,
where a copy is “an imitation, transcript, or reproduction of an original
work.”102 The definition’s most important feature is the emphasis placed on
duality; there can only be a copy when there is an original. The Third
Circuit referenced the photocopy as a prominent example of an allowable
copy.103 Although a simple point, the rest of Race Tires—indeed, the
entirety of the narrow interpretation—can be framed as the characterization
of a specific e-discovery activity as one of two acts: finding an original; or
creating a copy of that original. Under the Third Circuit’s definition, only
the latter is within the scope of § 1920(4).
Based on its definition, the Third Circuit allowed costs for those
activities within the scope of the statute under the narrow interpretation
(which, unsurprisingly, are also allowed under the broad interpretation).104
The court maintained that scanning hard-copy documents to create digital
versions and converting files from their native format to the courtprescribed production format fell within the statute.105 Additionally, the
Third Circuit allowed the costs to reformat VHS recordings as DVD
recordings, presumably as a type of format conversion.106
The court did not emphasize the point, but broad interpretation courts
often argue that all of the services of e-discovery vendors are “the 21st
Century equivalent of making copies.”107 By allowing these specific costs,
the Third Circuit agreed that there are electronic equivalents to making
copies but limited them to format conversion and document scanning

unclear invoice and the employer who, because of that invoice, could not recover its costs.
461 U.S. at 437.
101. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 166.
102. Id. Nearly identical, Black’s Law Dictionary defines a copy as “[a]n imitation or
reproduction of an original.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 385 (9th ed. 2009).
103. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 166.
104. Id. at 167.
105. Id. (citing Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 591 (7th Cir. 2009); BDT Prods.,
Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 405 F.3d 415, 420 (6th Cir. 2005), abrogated in part on other
grounds by Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997 (2012); Brown v. McGrawHill Cos., 526 F. Supp. 2d 950, 959 (N.D. Iowa 2007)).
106. Id.
107. CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1381 (N.D. Ga.
2009), vacated, 654 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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only.108 This restriction comports with its definition of a copy, a duplicate
of an original, because both scanning and converting documents clearly
begin with a single document and result in an exact reproduction of that
document.
3. Red Flag: The Third Circuit Finds the Broad Interpretation Divorced
from the Statute
Having adopted a meaning of copying, the Third Circuit’s remaining
task was to determine whether the broad or narrow interpretation of §
1920(4) more closely aligned with its definition.
The Third Circuit focused its analysis on the statute’s language, rejecting
the broad interpretation argument that the complexity of the services made
them taxable.109 Broad interpretation courts have made the complex nature
of e-discovery services their touchstone, emphasizing a pair of policy
considerations tied to that complexity. First, modern e-discovery requires
technical expertise well beyond that of most lawyers.110 As a result, the ediscovery vendor is indispensable to the discovery phase of the case being
completed.111 Second, using an expert as part of the discovery process can
be a major cost savings for the parties, so courts should encourage their
use.112 As a corollary, some courts maintain that shifting vendor costs also
serves as an effective limit on parties’ unreasonable discovery requests.113
The Third Circuit found the entire broad interpretation to be “untethered
from the statutory mooring.”114 The court drew a sharp distinction between
permitted, taxable activities and the preliminary steps that make such
activities possible.115 Although the court opined that ESI may need
“extensive ‘processing’ . . . to make a comprehensive and intelligible
production,” it stated that the statute “does not authorize taxation merely
108. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 169-70.
109. Id. at 169.
110. See Austin, supra note 3. The district court in Race Tires supported this aspect of the
broad interpretation, finding e-discovery “‘highly technical’ . . . [and] not ‘the type of
services that attorneys or paralegals are trained for or are capable of providing.’” Race Tires,
674 F.3d at 168 (quoting Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., No. 2:07–cv–
1294, 2011 WL 178620, at *9 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 2011)).
111. CBT Flint, 676 F. Supp. 2d at 1381 (“The services [of an e-discovery vendor] are
certainly necessary in the electronic age. The enormous burden and expense of electronic
discovery are well known.”).
112. See In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., 817 F. Supp. 2d 608, 615 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
113. CBT Flint, 676 F. Supp. 2d at 1381.
114. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 169.
115. Id.
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because today’s technology requires technical expertise not ordinarily
possessed by the typical legal professional.”116 The court’s position accords
with pre-digital interpretations of the statute, which did not award costs for
document review even when the responsive documents were later copied.117
The Third Circuit concluded that “Congress did not authorize taxation of
charges necessarily incurred to discharge discovery obligations. It allowed
only for the taxation of the costs of making copies.”118
4. Checkered Flag: The Third Circuit Adopts the Narrow Interpretation
Although Hoosier and DMS made a few additional arguments in favor of
being awarded costs, the Third Circuit found these arguments unimportant
and dismissed them with little discussion.119 Hoosier argued that the costs
of producing and the costs of copying discovery ESI could not be separated,
so all should be allowed.120 The circuit court pointed to other courts that
have separated the two and noted that it is the proponent’s burden to prove
that a cost fits within the statutory structure.121 The court also found
insignificant the argument that the provision in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for e-discovery somehow brought production of e-discovery
within the bounds of § 1920(4).122
Ultimately, the court allowed only $30,370.42 in costs, less than onetenth of the approximately $365,000 Hoosier and DMS sought.123 The
award covered only the costs of scanning paper documents to create
electronic versions and converting documents and videos from their native
format to the agreed-upon production format.124 The court disallowed all of
the costs associated with producing the discovery, as they did not fall
116. Id. It is worth noting that modern cases, especially involving e-discovery on the
scale of Race Tires, almost certainly will require processing from a specialist. As noted in
Part I above, modern parties are generating too much ESI for traditional discovery processes
to be feasible. And while some companies may have employees with the necessary technical
expertise, the majority will likely need to hire an outside vendor to manage the e-discovery
process.
117. See, e.g., Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1428 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[F]ees
are permitted only for the physical preparation and duplication of documents, not the
intellectual effort involved in their production.”), abrogated on other grounds by Townsend
v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990).
118. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 169.
119. Id. at 170-71.
120. Id. at 170.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 170-71.
123. Id. at 171.
124. Id.
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within § 1920(4).125 In doing so, it rejected the broad interpretation in favor
of what it saw as the interpretation more closely aligned with the definition
of copying.126
IV. After the Race Is Run: Analysis of the Narrow Interpretation in Light of
the Third Circuit’s Opinion
The narrow interpretation of § 1920(4), as exemplified by the Third
Circuit’s decision in Race Tires, aptly applies the classical, accepted
understanding of cost-shifting to modern e-discovery. Most importantly, the
narrow interpretation of § 1920(4) echoes Supreme Court opinions on
similar topics. It also melds with several of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure applicable to discovery, a point the Third Circuit did not explore.
Finally, the narrow interpretation avoids the trap of technological fear by
rejecting ignorance and requiring both judges and practitioners to
understand e-discovery. It is by far the better of the two interpretations of §
1920(4) and should be adopted wholesale by U.S. courts.
A. The Narrow Interpretation Mimics Supreme Court Decision Making on §
1920
The Third Circuit’s narrow interpretation aligns well with the Supreme
Court’s opinions on cost-shifting and the American Rule. In a recent
opinion, the Court held that Congress intended the taxable costs allowed
under § 1920 to be “modest in scope” rather than major exceptions.127 The
narrow interpretation, which essentially allows only minor cost-shifting, fits
firmly within this limited philosophy of the American Rule. Moreover, the
Court has unequivocally stated that, when it comes to cost-shifting and §
1920, lower courts have little discretion.128 Instead, courts are strictly
limited to the express provisions of the cost-shifting statute.129 If it were to
take a case on § 1920(4), the Supreme Court would likely find the latitude
of the broad interpretation to be so far from that position as to be ludicrous.
By contrast, the Court would likely view the Third Circuit’s decision in
Race Tires, and the narrow interpretation as a whole, as the logical
extension of its past precedent on cost-shifting and the American Rule.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 171-72.
Id.
Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2006 (2012).
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 442-43 (1987).
Id. at 445.
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The Third Circuit’s methodology in deciding the case was
extraordinarily similar to that used by the Supreme Court in its recent
interpretation of § 1920, and thus it would likely be upheld on appeal.
While the Court has not recently examined § 1920(4), two months after the
Third Circuit handed down its decision the Court interpreted § 1920(6) in
Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd.130 In that case, the Supreme Court
needed to define “interpreter” in order to apply the cost-shifting statute.131
The Court first surveyed modern dictionaries in an effort to find the term’s
“ordinary meaning.”132 Having done so, the Court then reviewed the history
and context of the statute as well as how prior courts had enforced the
phrase in order to determine whether the word had a meaning outside of the
ordinary.133 Finally, it applied its definition to the facts of the case at bar.134
Although the issue was not framed in exactly the same way, the Third
Circuit followed a similar pattern in deciding Race Tires. The fact that the
Third Circuit’s decision so closely parallels the higher court’s suggests that
the Third Circuit’s process for arriving at the narrow interpretation was
likely correct. When taken together, the two cases present a template for
future courts to use when interpreting § 1920.
B. An Unexplored Connection Between the Narrow Interpretation and Rule
34
Although not discussed by the Third Circuit, the narrow interpretation of
§ 1920(4) and Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure share an
interesting and unexpected symmetry. Rule 34 states that a responding
party must “produce and permit the requesting party . . . to inspect, copy,
test, or sample” any responsive discovery.135 Producing responsive
discovery documents is part of the responding party’s Rule 34 duty to
respond.136 As a cost of litigation, the American Rule would therefore
require the responding party to pay the associated expenses, including the
130. Taniguchi, 132 S. Ct. at 1997. Section 1920(6) allows a court to award as costs
“[c]ompensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees,
expenses, and costs of special interpretation services.” Id. at 2002.
131. Id.
132. Id. (citing Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995)).
133. Id. at 2004-05.
134. Id. at 2006-07.
135. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1) (emphasis added).
136. According to FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(B), a party’s response “must either state that
inspection and related activities will be permitted as requested or state an objection to the
request, including the reasons.” Thus, the responding party’s actions are limited to either
acquiescence or objection, nothing more.
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collection and review tasks e-discovery vendors commonly perform.137
However, nothing in Rule 34 requires delivery of a copy of the responsive
discovery to the requesting party, only that the responding party make the
discovery available.138 The Rule allows copying, but it implies that the
requesting party, not the responding party, is the one who will actually
make the copy.139 Just as it places the cost of production on the responding
party, Rule 34 seems to place the cost of transmission squarely on the
requesting party.140
In this, Rule 34 seems to match the narrow interpretation of § 1920(4).
The production requirement in Rule 34 does not distinguish between
whether the document is physical or electronic.141 Neither does the Third
Circuit’s narrow interpretation of § 1920(4).142 In either case, only those
costs associated with transmitting the document to the requesting party (i.e.,
those beyond the minimal requirements of Rule 34) are recoverable. Thus,
under both Rule 34 and § 1920(4) many of the costs associated with ediscovery vendors—including the data extraction, processing, and
searching done by Hoosier’s and DMS’s vendors—are the responsibility of
the responding party.143 The fact that it is the e-discovery vendor, and not

137. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (“[T]he presumption
is that the responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery requests.”).
138. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1).
139. Id.
140. Section 1920(4), viewed in the light of Rule 34, creates an exception to the
American Rule that is, in reality, the reverse of what it appears on the surface. At first
glance, it seems like § 1920(4) allows a suit’s winner to recover the money it spent on
copying from the loser, which the American Rule normally would not permit. However,
when reading Rule 34 it seems clear that each party’s cost of making copies during
discovery is in fact a litigation expense for the other party. Conceptually, the American Rule
would always require the losing party to pay the winner for those expenses because,
although the losing party asked the winning party to make the copies and bear the costs until
the end of the case, the ultimate expense always belonged to the losing party. The Rule does
not actually require either party to repay what the other party spent complying with
discovery requests. Where § 1920(4) is an exception to the American Rule, then, is in
denying the loser the opportunity to seek recompense from the winner.
141. While Rule 34 does give additional requirements for requests of ESI in subsection
(b)(2)(D), the basic requirements for producing both electronic and paper documents are the
same. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E).
142. Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 170 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012).
143. As Judge Rosenthal noted in Kellogg Brown & Root Intern., Inc. v. Altanmia
Commercial Mktg. Co., such acts are “more like the work of an attorney or legal assistant in
locating and segregating documents that may be responsive to discovery than it is like
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the attorney, who is producing the discovery is irrelevant; cost-shifting is
allowable only for acts involved in transmitting discovery from responding
to requesting parties. There is no evidence that the drafters of the Rules of
Civil Procedure had § 1920(4) in mind when they updated Rule 34 to
include e-discovery,144 so there is no way to determine if the harmony
between statute and Rule is more than coincidence. If nothing else, though,
the degree of symmetry between the two lends additional, correlative
support for the narrow interpretation of § 1920(4).
C. The Fear of Technology Is Not a Sound Basis for Decision
Perhaps implicit in the Third Circuit’s argument is a condemnation of
broad interpretation courts that awarded costs based on an unwillingness to
face the changing technological landscape. The policies on which the broad
interpretation is based—expertise beyond the lawyer’s ken, cost savings,
and controlling discovery—are conspicuously absent from the language of
the statute, yet courts found them persuasive nevertheless.145 The difference
may lie in how very alien new technology can be, as illustrated by analogy.
In the pre-digital world, a lawyer with no understanding of the Dewey
Decimal System may have needed the assistance of an experienced librarian
in order to locate and copy books in a library, but no one would have
argued that the librarian’s efforts were taxable under § 1920(4). Even one
unfamiliar with finding books in a library would know that the librarian was
not involved in the act of copying, only in finding the materials to be
copied. The same likely was not true for e-discovery, especially given the
legal profession’s notoriety for refusing to adopt modern technology in
favor of cherished archaisms.146 It may have been easier simply to call
copying those documents for use in a case.” Civ. Action No. H-07-2684, 2009 WL 1457632,
at *5 (S.D. Tex. May 26, 2009).
144. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 and Advisory Committee notes.
145. Id.
146. Some judges are notorious for not fully understanding, much less embracing,
changes in technology. Although accepted now, even innocuous courtroom technology like
digital projectors faced stiff opposition from the bench when initially introduced. Stan
Gibson, Evolving Courtroom Technology, GPSOLO TECHNOLOGY & PRACTICE GUIDE (June
2006), http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp_so
lo_magazine_index/courtroomtechnology.html. Justice Breyer has spoken openly about the
need for judges to understand modern technology, pointing to examples of his own and other
high court justices’ misunderstandings of modern technology. Erik Shelzig, Supreme Court
Justices Must Adapt to Facebook World, Says Breyer, NBC NEWS (Nov. 16, 2010, 8:14
PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40224302/ns/technology_and_science-tech_and_gad
gets/t/supreme-court-justices-must-adapt-facebook-world-says-breyer/#.UJ1l6Id9u.
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everything “the 21st Century equivalent of making copies” than to dig into
the expanding, and confounding, world of ESI.147 However, the emerging
world of e-discovery requires the same careful consideration given to more
traditional legal issues, even though it is likely unfamiliar. Both lawyers
and judges must banish their fear and expand their knowledge of this new
area in order to give parties good counsel and sound decisions.
As the Third Circuit explained, neither the language of the statute, nor its
history and context would support the adoption of anything but the narrow
interpretation.148 The broad interpretation, appealing though it may be, is
fundamentally flawed because its underlying policy concerns have no basis
in the language of the statute. The narrow interpretation, on the other hand,
is rooted in both the tradition of the American Rule and the current
language of § 1920. Moreover, the language of Rule 34 gives additional
support to the narrow interpretation. Although Hoosier and DMS
undoubtedly hoped for a different outcome, the Third Circuit’s decision is
the best possible interpretation of § 1920(4).
V. The Post-Race Press Conference: The State of § 1920(4) After Race
Tires
The real question following any major case is a simple one: What
happens now? For the parties seeking costs in Race Tires, they are left with
the bill for their e-discovery vendors, slightly souring an otherwise
impressive victory on the merits. But for the legal community as a whole,
the Third Circuit’s opinion returns an old paradigm to a new world, creating
uncertainty. This section addresses some of the varied consequences of
Race Tires, including the likelihood of its adoption in other circuits and
new areas of concern for clients and attorneys in those circuits where it is
adopted.
A. The Adoption of Race Tires in Other Circuits
Despite the logic of the Race Tires opinion, the holding is binding law
only on the Third Circuit and related lower courts. The Supreme Court
denied certiorari on appeal,149 with two effects: First, Race Tires remains
good law in the Third Circuit. And second, the chance to create national
147. CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1381 (N.D. Ga.
2009), vacated, 654 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
148. Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 171 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012).
149. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp. v. Race Tires Am., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012).
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precedent on the issue has passed for at least one more term. But the dearth
of appellate cases on point could (and should) lead the district courts of
other circuits to use Race Tires as a model for their own decisions.150 While
the future remains uncertain, the signs point toward other circuits adopting
the narrow interpretation of § 1920(4).
Some courts have already cited Race Tires approvingly, while others
have shown a willingness to adopt its reasoning. At present, district courts
in the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have already cited to and
followed the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Race Tires.151 And the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals recently adopted the Third Circuit’s approach.152
Although not unanimous, there is a definite trend toward adopting the
narrow interpretation of § 1920(4) set out in Race Tires.
Of the circuits that have not yet adopted Race Tires, some simply have
not had occasion to address it. As of January 2014, no court in the First,
Second, or D.C. Circuits, at either the appellate or district court level, has
addressed the definition of “copying” in the last five years. Most of those
courts’ § 1920(4) cases have focused on exemplification or necessity, rather
than the nature of a copy and the increasing role of e-discovery vendors.153
As such, it is not possible at present to determine how those circuits will
react when presented with the issue. However, given the large number of
150. As the Third Circuit itself stated in an earlier case, “Opinions on cost disputes
seldom reach official reporters.” In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 630 F.2d 183, 191 (3d Cir.
1980). While many recent appellate cases discuss cost-shifting, they are far more often in the
context of determining whether the particular amount awarded was an abuse of the district
court’s discretion. See, e.g., Ford v. Donley, 485 F. App’x 305, 310 (10th Cir. 2012); Little
Rock Cardiology Clinic PA v. Baptist Health, 591 F.3d 591, 602 (8th Cir. 2009).
151. See, e.g., Phillip M. Adams & Assocs., L.L.C. v. Sony Electrs. Inc., No. 1:05–CV–
64 TS, 2013 WL 5964288, at *4 (D. Utah Nov. 7, 2013); Johnson v. Allstate Ins. Co., No.
07-CV-0781-SCW, 2012 WL 4936598, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2012); El Camino Res., Ltd.
v. Huntington Nat. Bank, No. 1:07-CV-598, 2012 WL 4808741, at *7 (W.D. Mich. May 3,
2012), report and recommendation approved, No. 1:07-CV-598, 2012 WL 4808736 (W.D.
Mich. Oct. 10, 2012); Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 6:09-CV-446, 2012 WL
4092586, at *5 (E.D. Tex. July 19, 2012).
152. Country Vintner of N.C., LLC v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, Inc., 718 F.3d 249, 260-61
(4th Cir. 2013).
153. See, e.g., Haemonetics Corp. v. Fenwal, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 2d 110, 116 (D. Mass.
2012) (determining whether computer-generated graphics qualified as both exemplification
and reasonably necessary); Youssef v. F.B.I., 762 F. Supp. 2d 76, 87-88 (D.D.C. 2011)
(interpreting § 1920(4) and a similar local rule regarding copies of exhibits); Hamptons
Locations, Inc. v. Rubens, No. 01-CV-5477(DRH)(WDW), 2010 WL 3522808, at *8
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2010) (discussing whether certified copies of documents that could have
been, but were not, provided during discovery could be taxed).
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other courts adopting the Third Circuit’s reasoning, it seems more likely
than not that all three circuits would follow suit.
The Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits present a more interesting
scenario because the courts in those circuits face conflicting precedents.
Past district court decisions in the Eighth Circuit have followed both the
broad and narrow interpretations of § 1920(4).154 Recent decisions seem to
show that district courts in the Eighth Circuit view Race Tires as
persuasive.155 However, with support for both positions, there is a basis for
any potential decision a district court could make. Until the appellate court
takes up the issue, there can be no predicting the results in the Eighth
Circuit.
The situation is similar for the Ninth Circuit. There, at least one district
court rejected Race Tires in favor of a previous Ninth Circuit decision
employing the broad interpretation.156 However, following the district court
decision the Supreme Court reversed the appellate precedent on which it
relied.157 No court in the Ninth Circuit has followed Race Tires explicitly,
but two recent decisions have followed similar arguments and upheld a
narrow interpretation of § 1920.158 The conflicting precedents in the Eighth
and Ninth Circuits make prediction in those circuits less accurate, but the
narrow interpretation of § 1920(4) nonetheless seems to be gaining traction
in both.
Courts in the Eleventh Circuit may be attempting to find a middle ground
between the broad and narrow interpretations. One district court has firmly
sided with the narrow interpretation espoused by the Third Circuit,159 while

154. Compare B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Fastenal Co., No. 4:10–cv–00317–SWW, 2011
WL 6829625, at *7 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 16, 2011) (allowing vendor costs to be recovered) with
Little Rock Cardiology Clinic, P.A. v. Baptist Health, No. 4:06CV01594 JLH, 2009 WL
763556, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 19, 2009) (denying recovery of vendor costs).
155. See Trip Mate, Inc. v. Stonebridge Cas. Ins. Co., Nos. 10–0793–CV–W–ODS, 11–
1097–CV–W–ODS, 2013 WL 3336631, at *1 (W.D. Mo. July 2, 2013); Hallmark Cards,
Inc. v. Monitor Clipper Partners, Inc., No. 08–0840–CV–W–ODS, 2013 WL 1155245, at *1
(W.D. Mo. Mar. 20, 2013); Amana Soc’y, Inc. v. Excel Eng’g, Inc., No. 10–CV–168–LRR,
2013 WL 427394, at *5-6 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 4, 2013).
156. See In re Online DVD Rental Antitrust Litig., No. M 09–2029 PJH, 2012 WL
1414111, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2012) (citing Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 633
F.3d 1218, 1221 (9th Cir. 2011)).
157. Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2007 (2012).
158. See Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc., No. C 09–01714 WHA (LB), 2012 WL
5269667, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2012); Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C 10–03561
WHA, 2012 WL 3822129, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2012).
159. Finnerty v. Stiefel Labs., Inc., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1322 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 16, 2012).
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another, older decision fell in line with the broad interpretation.160 The
Federal Circuit, applying Eleventh Circuit law, adopted the narrow
interpretation in the main but differed from Race Tires on the subject of
metadata.161 The court found that the Third Circuit’s classification of
metadata extraction as unrecoverable under § 1920(4) was too restrictive,
stating: “It seems to us that there is no good reason, as a default matter, to
distinguish copying one part of an electronic document (i.e., the part that is
visible when printed) from copying other parts (i.e., parts not immediately
visible) when both parts are requested.”162 However, the majority’s
reasoning faced a stiff dissent on that point, which argued that the majority
was “rewrit[ing] § 1920(4) to address the increasing cost of electronic
discovery.”163 After the Federal Circuit’s ruling, it is unclear exactly what
the boundaries are of this expanded narrow interpretation or whether the
middle ground interpretation will spread beyond the Eleventh Circuit.
It is too soon to tell if the narrow interpretation will become the only
interpretation of § 1920(4), but that day seems fast approaching. Courts in a
majority of circuits have already adopted the Third Circuit’s reasoning, and
other circuits are likely to do so when the opportunity arises in light of its
sound reasoning and easy application.164 There are some courts where the
broad interpretation remains, but it seems to be losing its hold. Although an
accurate prediction is not wholly possible, the trend among the various
circuits swings toward embracing the narrow interpretation espoused by
Race Tires.165

160. Klayman v. Freedom’s Watch, Inc., No. 07-22433-CIV, 2008 WL 4194881, at *7
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2008), superseded by statute, Judicial Administration and Technical
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-406, 122 Stat. 4291, as recognized in Finnerty,
900 F. Supp. 2d at 1322.
161. CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., No. 2013–1036, 2013 WL 6510953,
at *10 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13, 2013).
162. Id.
163. Id. at *13 (O’Malley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
164. Country Vintner of N.C., LLC v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, Inc., 718 F.3d 249, 260 (4th
Cir. 2013) (“The [Third Circuit] properly took into account the statute’s history, its plain
language, and the Supreme Court’s narrow contemporary interpretation of the costs taxable
under § 1920.”).
165. It is important to remember that the Third Circuit dealt with only one piece of §
1920(4), the meaning of “copying.” The Court did not deal with the necessity aspect of the
statute, so circuits may continue to differ in their treatment of § 1920(4) as a whole even if
all of them adopt the Race Tires interpretation of “copying.” See, e.g., Mann v. Heckler &
Koch Def., Inc., No. 1:08cv611, 2011 WL 1599580, at *7 (E.D. Virg. Apr. 28, 2011)
(collecting cases).
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B. Potential Consequences of the Narrow Interpretation’s Adoption
With the majority of courts adopting or likely to adopt a narrow
interpretation of § 1920(4), the next step is to examine the consequences of
that adoption for the justice system. As with any issue involving the
American Rule, the most important consequences revolve around money.
The Third Circuit closed the door some lawyers were using to secure
additional funds for their clients. Now, lawyers and their clients will need to
address a new set of potentially unpleasant issues, including the possibility
of discovery sanctions, the likelihood of similar rulings in other areas of
law, and the need for additional clarity in § 1920 motions.
1. The Narrow Interpretation As the Cause of Discovery Sanctions in EDiscovery Cases
The Third Circuit’s decision creates the possibility for discovery
sanctions against lawyers with clients who cannot afford an e-discovery
vendor. By requiring all parties to pay for their own expenses, the American
Rule attempts to prevent a party from forgoing a suit for fear of financial
ruin if it loses.166 However, by preventing the suit’s winner from securing
recompense for its e-discovery costs the Third Circuit may unintentionally
bar poor parties from suits. Parties use vendors’ services because those
services are almost mandatory in modern cases; that concern was one of the
bases of the broad interpretation for good reason.167 If a party cannot pay a
vendor to manage its e-discovery needs, it may not be able to comply with a
legitimate discovery request or the subsequent order to compel.168 Such a
failure could open the party to sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 37.169 While it seems unlikely a judge would levy a major
penalty for this type of violation,170 even a minor penalty (e.g., a single
166. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
167. See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text.
168. Cf. In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 650, 661-64 (M.D. Fla. 2007)
(finding that failure to meet e-discovery requests merited sanctions, even though attempts at
production were made).
169. The potential sanctions are listed in FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A). Sanctions often will
not be given if the party has shown “an impossibility to comply with the discovery orders.”
In re Chase & Sanborn Corp., 872 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1989).
170. Many courts approach sanction motions using a multi-factor analysis, with possible
factors including the reason for the failure to disclose, the prejudice to the other party’s case
from the non-disclosure, and whether the party was warned that sanctions were a possibility.
See, e.g., Phelan v. Campbell, No. 12-736, 2013 WL 28361, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 3, 2013);
Universal Health Grp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 12-1323, 2013 WL 28363, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan.
3, 2013).
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disputed fact being admitted for the opposing party’s benefit) could prove
decisive. In essence, preventing cost shifting could lead to parties being
unable or unwilling to continue a case, for fear of discovery sanctions
ending their hope of victory.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do have a solution in place to
permit cost-shifting in these situations, but even that solution is not
foolproof. Under Rule 26(c), a party can seek an order protecting them from
an “undue burden or expense” resulting from discovery requests.171 The
Supreme Court has not addressed cost-shifting under Rule 26(c) in the
context of e-discovery, but in the past it has affirmed the ability of courts to
shift costs when necessary while reiterating the importance of the American
Rule.172 Rule 26(c) was not an issue in Race Tires, as neither party sought a
cost-shifting order from the court.173 However, when a party seeks a 26(c)
order in the context of e-discovery, many courts will require it to satisfy the
two-part Zubulake test.174 At a basic level, the test requires both that the
data sought be “inaccessible” and that several of seven possible factors be
present.175 Meeting that burden is certainly not as easily achieved as simply
presenting one’s financial inability to the court.176 Thus, even though the
Rules of Civil Procedure create the potential for parties to shift costs and

171. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).
172. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358-59 (1978).
173. Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 171 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012).
174. The Zubulake test was conceived as part of a series of cases, the first being
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). A full inspection of the
Zubulake test is well beyond the scope of this note.
175. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The seven
factors are:
1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant
information;
2. The availability of such information from other sources;
3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in controversy;
4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources available to each
party;
5. The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so;
6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and
7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.
Id. (citing Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 324).
176. For a discussion of the Zubulake analysis and its potential problems, see generally
Andrew Mast, Note, Cost-Shifting in E-Discovery: Reexamining Zubulake and 28 U.S.C. §
1920, 56 WAYNE L. REV. 1825 (2010); John T. Yip, Comment, Addressing the Cost and
Comity Concerns of International E-Discovery, 87 WASH. L. REV. 595 (2012).
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avoid sanctions, the solution is not so easily achieved that a party worried
about paying an e-discovery vendor could rely on it.177
The Third Circuit’s decision has the definite potential to create problems
for clients who lack the funds to pay an e-discovery vendor. Without the
vendor’s help, the party may be sanctioned for not meeting their discovery
obligations. The broad interpretation of § 1920(4) gave parties the ability to
force the loser to pay for all e-discovery costs. Thus, the Race Tires
decision created an increased incentive for cost-shifting during the
discovery process, as the parties can no longer hope for recovery after a
victory. However, the uncertainties surrounding the Zubulake test make
cost-shifting protective orders a dubious refuge. Practitioners and clients
will need to address this issue in the planning and discovery stages of the
suit in order to avoid the potential pitfalls of a post-Race Tires judgment.
2. Race Tires and the Narrowing of the Cost-Shifting Statute
Another potential consequence of the Third Circuit’s decision could
come in the form of narrower rulings on other parts of § 1920. As noted
above, many district courts have already adopted the Third Circuit’s narrow
interpretation of § 1920(4).178 However, in conjunction with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd.,179 the Third
Circuit’s decision may serve as the impetus to impose a narrow
construction on all cost-shifting, or at least that governed by § 1920. Thus, a
practitioner whose case hinges on the broad interpretation of the word
“exemplification,” which was not an issue in either Race Tires or
Taniguchi, now may nevertheless be facing an adverse ruling if the judge
feels the term should be defined as narrowly as “copy” and “interpreter.”180
The same could be true for whether, and to what extent, the fees of a private
process server could be recovered under § 1920(1).181 Together, Taniguchi
and Race Tires could spell the end of the broad interpretation of any piece
177. The Rules of Civil Procedure do not prohibit parties from creating an enforceable
cost-sharing agreement prior to discovery, but even that solution requires pre-planning and
agreement among the parties. See In re Ricoh Co. Patent Litig., 661 F.3d 1361, 1366-67
(Fed. Cir. 2011). In a contentious case like Race Tires, such agreement would have been, at
the least, unlikely.
178. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
179. Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2006 (2012).
180. An example of a case where changing from the broad to narrow interpretation of
“exemplification” would have been decisive is Cefalu v. Village of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416,
428 (7th Cir. 2000).
181. Schwartz & Schwartz of Virg., LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, No. 6:07CV-00042, 2010 WL 452743, at *3 (W.D. Virg. Feb. 8, 2010) (collecting cases).
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of § 1920, and practitioners will need to be aware of this potential shift in
interpretation.
3. Presenting the Bill to a Narrow Interpretation Court
One final consequence could be the imposition of tighter requirements
on the bills that parties present. As noted above, a party must justify its
motion for cost-shifting under § 1920 by demonstrating the costs fit within
the statutory limits.182 As the Third Circuit’s ire reveals, some parties’ proof
of statutory compliance has been to give the court the invoices that they
were given by their e-discovery vendors.183 However, those bills can be
vague and confusing, which could lead a court either to deny the motion for
failure to meet the statutory requirements or to create its own estimate of
the costs.184 There are two possible paths forward: either pressure the
vendor to provide a more detailed breakdown of its charges or supplement a
less-than-adequate bill with additional explanation. In either case, parties
and their lawyers will need to pay much closer attention to what is on their
vendor’s bill as a result of Race Tires.
The Third Circuit’s decision created a variety of possible consequences.
Attorneys and clients involved in cost-shifting cases will need to exercise
extra care in order to avoid previously unknown pitfalls. Lawyers in ediscovery cases will need to factor in the cost of an e-discovery vendor
when discussing the cost of a suit with their clients, along with the potential
ramifications of discovery sanctions. Any party attempting to recover costs
under § 1920 will need to be aware that recent decisions, Race Tires
prominent among them, make a narrow interpretation of the statute more
likely than in the past. And parties will need to examine their bills of costs
much more closely, possibly with some pressure on vendors, to ensure that
the bills meet statutory requirements. While the Third Circuit’s reasoning in
Race Tires cannot be faulted, practitioners should not underestimate the
potential consequences for clients and themselves.
VI. Conclusion
With its decision in Race Tires, the Third Circuit explored the definition
of “copying” in 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4). Prior to the computer revolution,
when the dominant medium of discovery was paper, no one questioned
182. See supra notes 174-177 and accompanying text.
183. Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 166-67 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012).
184. Bennett, supra note 49, at 552.
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what a copying cost was—it was the cost to duplicate a piece of paper. The
proliferation of computers, and the subsequent rise of e-discovery, led some
courts to expand the meaning of “copy” to include all e-discovery activities
and vendor costs. In reality, these courts were misguided; as the Third
Circuit’s opinion shows, the statute is much narrower than such a reading.
A copy, either paper or electronic, is a duplicate of an original. While the
means of duplicating an electronic document differ from those used to
duplicate physical documents, the end result is the same. The Third
Circuit’s opinion was grounded on this bedrock principle, and its adoption
of the narrow interpretation of § 1920(4) logically followed. Its decision
returns an analysis, fraught with traps of modern technology, to its
traditional roots in the American Rule. It can and does serve as a model for
other courts, and as such it will have long-lasting consequences for judges,
lawyers, clients, and vendors. With its holding in Race Tires, the Third
Circuit crafted a dominant interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) and created
a cost-shifting precedent that is likely to last until the next technological
revolution.
Jason L. Callaway
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